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Abstract 
 
Research has increasingly focussed on the benefits of meditation in everyday life and performance. 
Mindfulness in particular improves attention, working memory capacity, and reading 
comprehension. Given its emphasis on moment-to-moment awareness, we hypothesised that 
mindfulness meditation would alter time perception. Using a within-subjects design, participants 
carried out a temporal bisection task, where several probe durations are compared to “short” and 
“long” standards. Following this, participants either listened to an audiobook or a meditation that 
focussed on the movement of breath in the body. Finally, participants completed the temporal 
bisection task for a second time. The control group showed no change after the listening task. 
However, meditation led to a relative overestimation of durations. Within an internal clock 
framework, a change in attentional resources can produce longer perceived durations. This 
meditative effect has wider implications for the use of mindfulness as an everyday practice and a 
basis for clinical treatment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Research over the last few decades has begun to explore the effects of traditional Buddhist 
practices that have been around for millennia. Mindfulness, originally defined as having awareness, 
attention, and remembering (Bodhi, 2000), is one such example. Practitioners learn to focus their 
attention on both external and internal sensory stimuli with a non-judgmental awareness of the 
present moment (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). The goals of such a practice include improved metacognitive 
awareness, decreased rumination through a reduction in perseveration, and enhanced attention 
through gains in working memory (Davis & Hayes, 2011). Important for the current research is the 
idea that mindfulness meditation can help practitioners to focus their attention on moment-to-
moment awareness, and that this attention can be directed internally (such as on one’s breathing) as 
well as externally. An enhanced moment-to-moment awareness might be expected to alter our sense 
of time, given the increased focus on the ‘here and now’. However, few studies to date have 
considered the effects of such practices on time perception, i.e., how mindfulness meditation might 
affect the subjective passage of time. 
Investigators have started to identify the benefits of mindfulness and mindfulness-based 
therapies in a variety of domains. These include decreases in rumination (Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 
2008), improvements in cognitive flexibility (Moore & Malinowski, 2009), working memory 
capacity and sustained attention (Chamber et al., 2008; Jha, Stanley, Kiyonaga, Wong, & Gelfand, 
2010; MacLean et al., 2010; Mrazek, Franklin, Phillips, Baird, & Schooler, 2013), and reductions in 
reactivity (Cahn & Polich, 2009), anxiety and depressive symptoms (Hoffman, Sawyer, Witt, & Oh, 
2010). Indeed, mindfulness-based treatments appear to provide broad antidepressant and antianxiety 
effects, as well as decreases in general psychological distress (Marchand, 2012). As such, these 
interventions have been applied with a variety of patients, including those suffering from 
fibromyalgia, psoriasis, cancer, binge eating, and chronic pain, although the efficacy of specific 
methods requires further investigation (see meta-analysis by Baer, 2003). 
While researchers have begun to uncover the effects of mindfulness on cognitive processes 
like working memory or attention, there has been little experimental consideration with regard to 
how mindfulness practice may affect the perception of time. The most common models used within 
the field of time perception posit a single internal clock, which includes a pacemaker (Church, 
1984; Treisman, Faulkner, Naish, & Brogan, 1990) and an attentional gate (Zakay & Block, 1997). 
In these models, the pacemaker is responsible for emitting pulses, while the attention-controlled 
switch closes at the onset, and opens at the offset, of a stimulus, allowing pulses to enter an 
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accumulator. Time estimation is based on the number of pulses accumulated, with more pulses 
leading to an increase in perceived duration. Arousal produces an overestimation of time due to an 
increase in the pacemaker’s speed (Maricq, Roberts, & Church, 1981; Meck, 1983; Wearden & 
Penton-Voak, 1995; although see Lui, Penney, & Schirmer, 2011). In contrast, if attention to the 
task distracts from the processing of temporal information, this opens the switch and some pulses 
are lost. The result is an underestimation of time (e.g., Tipples, 2010; for a review, see Lejeune, 
1998). Importantly, meditation appears to manipulate both attention and arousal level (e.g. West, 
1987). Glicksohn’s (2001) modification of the above model aimed to incorporate the potential 
effects of meditation. Here, perceived duration is defined as the product of the number of subjective 
time units (synonymous with pulses in the internal clock model) and the size of these units. During 
focussed meditation, there is an increase in internally oriented attention and a reduction in arousal 
(Schuman, 1980). A more efficient allocation of attentional resources to internal stimulation is 
thought to decrease the number of subjective time units (due to a decrease in arousal, much like the 
original model) and increase the size of the subjective time units (Zakay, 1989). Consequently, 
there is an increase in perceived duration and the flow of time becomes slower. 
Mindfulness training involves deliberately staying in the present moment for as long and as 
continuously as possible (Hollis-Walker & Colosimo, 2011). Indeed, researchers found that 
mindfulness meditation experts were able to stabilise a bistable image (the Necker Cube) for longer 
in comparison with non-meditators, suggesting a longer duration of subjective nowness (Sauer et 
al., 2012). This result can be explained by evidence suggesting that mindfulness meditation trains 
attentional skills and produces increased attentional resources (Lutz, Slagter, Dunne, & Davidson, 
2008). If mindfulness meditators are able to attend to a given task while still being able to apply 
these increased resources to the processing of temporal information, this would close the internal 
clock’s switch and accumulate additional pulses (in terms of the conventional model above). 
Alternatively, the ability to increase the amount of internally oriented attention would increase the 
size of subjective time units (modified model). In both cases, we might therefore hypothesise a 
resulting overestimation of time. In the only previous study on this topic, participants were asked to 
produce specified target durations by pressing a finger button, and mindfulness meditation 
practitioners produced longer durations than controls (Berkovich-Ohana, Glicksohn, & Goldstein, 
2012). This is equivalent to participants underestimating durations since the slower accumulation of 
pulses (or time units) would cause participants to wait longer before responding that a target 
duration had passed, but would feel like an experienced duration had lasted for a shorter amount of 
time. Longer produced durations may be explained by a decrease in arousal (due to a decrease in 
pacemaker speed), potentially combined with the hypothesised increase in size of the subjective 
time units. 
In the current experiment, we employed the temporal bisection task, which was developed to 
test the predictions of clock-based models (e.g., Chambon, Droit-Volet, & Niedenthal, 2008). In a 
training phase, participants learn two standard durations, one short and one long. In the testing 
phase, they are presented with comparison stimulus durations (the standards and also intermediate 
durations). The task is to classify each comparison duration as more similar to either the short or the 
long standard duration. If mindfulness meditation produces an overestimation of time, this should 
lead participants who carry out a meditation task to more often classify the comparison durations as 
similar to the long standard (compared with their performance prior to meditation). In contrast, 
performance for participants in a control group should remain unchanged. 
 
2. Materials and methods 
 
2.1. Participants 
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Forty undergraduate students from the University of Kent (age range, 18-24 years; 35 
females) participated in exchange for course credits. 
 
2.2. Design 
 
The experiment was defined by five factors that described the testing and stimuli: Group 
(control or meditation) x Session (first or second) x Shape (circle or square) x Colour (red, green, 
blue) x Duration (400, 600, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400, 1600ms). Group varied between participants, 
while all other factors varied within participants. The dependent measure was the proportion of 
“long” responses (see Section 2.4). 
 
2.3. Materials 
 
Participants were tested individually in a quiet laboratory room, with an electric fan providing 
background ‘white noise’. The experiment was presented on a Dell laptop computer using custom 
MATLAB software to control the presentation of the experimental stimuli and to record the 
participants’ responses. The stimulus used for the representation of duration during training blocks 
was a grey oval (3.5 x 7cm). During the testing block, squares (5 x 5cm) and circles (5.5cm 
diameter) with identical surface areas, saturation, and brightness were presented in three different 
colours (RGB values in square brackets): red [230 0 0], green [0 230 0], and blue [0 0 230]. Each 
shape was presented in the centre of the screen on a black background. 
Participants completed basic demographic information along with two measures of 
mindfulness during everyday life. The Mindfulness Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & 
Ryan, 2003) consists of 15 items that are rated on a 6-point Likert scale from 1 (almost always) to 6 
(almost never), where the mean rating across all items represents the final score, with higher scores 
reflecting greater mindfulness. The Five-Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer, Smith, 
Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006) consists of 39 items that are rated on a 5-point Likert scale 
from 1 (never or very rarely true) to 5 (very often or always true). Mean ratings (after reverse 
scoring specific items) are calculated for each of five facets: observing, describing, acting with 
awareness, non-judging of inner experience, and non-reactivity to inner experience. Again, higher 
scores reflect greater mindfulness. 
Given that the FFMQ is derived from a factor analysis of several questionnaires including the 
MAAS, we would predict at least some correlation between participants’ scores on these 
instruments. However, since such relationships are far from perfect (Baer et al., 2006) and both 
measures remain popular, we decided to include both questionnaires in the current study. 
In the listening task, participants in the control group listened to the beginning of the 
audiobook version of ‘The Hobbit’ (Shaw, 2005). Those in the meditation group listened to a 
‘mindfulness of body and breath’ exercise (Williams & Penman, 2011) designed to focus their 
attention on the movement of the breath in the body. We selected an audiobook as a control since it 
requires a comparable amount of attention and concentration to the meditation task, although the 
focus of attention in the two tasks was necessarily, and importantly, different. We decided that this 
better matched the meditation task in comparison with a mental arithmetic task (Hölzel et al., 2007) 
or no task at all. The audio recordings were presented using Beyerdynamic DT770 closed-back 
headphones. 
 
2.4. Procedure 
 
Participants were informed through a printed information sheet that the experiment 
investigated “individual differences in how we judge the passage of time”. They first completed 
both questionnaires along with demographic information. Following this, participants performed a 
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temporal bisection task (first session) composed of two successive phases: training and testing. In 
the training phase, participants were shown the short and long stimulus durations, represented by 
the grey oval stimulus. The short standard stimulus duration (S) was 400ms and the long one (L) 
1600ms. Each standard was initially presented five times in alternation. Participants responded by 
pressing the “d” and “k” keys on the computer keyboard after the short and the long standard 
durations. The key-response match was counterbalanced across participants. Next, each participant 
performed a block of trials in which S and L had 50% probability of appearing on each trial. This 
block terminated only after participants responded correctly on eight consecutive trials. Throughout 
training, the inter-trial interval was randomly chosen between 1s and 3s. Accuracy feedback, 
positive (“correct”) or negative (“incorrect”), was presented for 2s in the centre of the computer 
screen. The experimenter remained with the participant to make sure there were no difficulties 
during training, but the participant was alone during the testing phase. 
In the testing phase, the participants were presented with coloured squares and circles that 
represented the seven comparison durations (400, 600, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400, and 1600ms). Their 
task was to judge whether the duration of each presented shape was closer to S or L. Each 
combination of shape (circle, square) and colour (red, green, blue) was presented three times for 
each comparison duration, producing a total of 126 trials. The trials were presented in a random 
order with no accuracy feedback, and the inter-trial interval was randomly chosen between 1s and 
3s. Viewing distance was approximately 60cm but was not fixed. 
On completion, participants then listened to a 10min audio recording with instructions to 
follow along as best they could, and to inform the experimenter when it finished. Those in the 
meditation group were presented with a breathing exercise while those in the control group listened 
to a neutral recording (see Section 2.3). The assignment of participants to groups alternated, based 
upon when they took part.  
After the listening task, participants completed the temporal bisection task again (second 
session). The procedure was identical to earlier, including the use of the training phase. As before, 
the experimenter remained with the participant during training, but the participant was alone during 
the testing phase. No breaks were provided between tasks. 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1. Preliminary analyses 
 
Participants’ scores on the MAAS and FFMQ were calculated, and the two groups (control vs. 
meditation) were subsequently compared. Participants in the two groups did not differ in age, 
MAAS scores, or on any of the five factor scores (all ts < 1.26, all ps > .22). 
Prior to analysis of the temporal bisection data, the mean proportion of “long” responses was 
calculated for each of the six types of stimuli (two shapes and three colours) for each participant, 
separately for each of the two sessions1. In addition, to allow exploration of the magnitude of the 
differences in temporal perception between the first and second sessions, the proportions of ‘‘long’’ 
responses for each participant for each stimulus duration and session (across all stimuli) were 
																																								 																				
1 These proportions for both groups were entered into a five-way mixed analysis of variance including Group (2), 
Session (2), Shape (2), Colour (3), and Duration (7). The predicted Group x Session interaction approached 
significance, F(1, 38) = 2.85, p = .100. However, this interaction lacked statistical power (.39), and given that we 
hypothesised group differences regarding the influence of the listening task, we subsequently analysed the two groups 
separately. 
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transformed with the probit function to z-scores2. Then, an index of difference d’ was calculated by 
subtracting the z-score for the first session from the z-score for the second session (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 1991), yielding 7 d’ scores for each participant. These d’	values are positive if the 
temporal stimulus was judged to match the longer standard more often in the second compared to 
the first session. Positive d’ values thus indicate that stimulus duration was perceived as longer in 
the second session. Conversely, d’ values are negative if the temporal stimulus was judged to match 
the longer standard less often in the second compared to the first session. Negative d’ values thus 
indicate that stimulus duration was perceived as shorter in the second session. 
Finally, the bisection point (BP; the point of subjective equality, i.e., the duration at which the 
proportion of “long” responses equals 0.5) was calculated for each participant for each session 
(across all trials). Although several methods exist for determining the BP, they tend to produce 
similar values (Wearden & Ferrara, 1995). Here, we used the most straightforward method of 
interpolating the duration from the straight line joining the two data points that straddle the region 
where the 50% “long” responses occurred (Raslear, 1983). The advantage of this method is that it 
involves no assumptions regarding the shape of the psychometric function, in contrast with linear 
regression methods. 
Although we might predict that participants’ BPs would demonstrate a relationship with their 
trait mindfulness scores on the MAAS and the FFMQ, we found no significant correlations with 
their BPs during the first or second sessions (all ps > .258). Participants’ BP differences (second 
session minus first) also showed no relationship with questionnaire scores (all ps > .149). Finally, 
these analyses were carried out for the two groups separately, again producing no significant 
correlations (all ps > .083). 
 
3.2. Control group 
 
Fig. 1 shows the mean proportion of “long” responses plotted against duration for participants 
in the control group. These proportions were entered into a four-way within-participant analysis of 
variance including Session (2), Shape (2), Colour (3), and Duration (7). As expected, there was a 
significant main effect of Duration, F(6, 114) = 239.45, p < .0001, indicating that mean proportions 
varied across stimulus durations. There was no main effect of Session, F(1, 19) = 2.53, p = .129,and 
no other main effects or interactions were significant (all Fs < 2.73, all ps > .078). 
To further examine whether stimulus durations differed in the two sessions, we used a one-
sample t-test to determine if the average d’	was significantly different from zero. As expected, there 
was no significant difference, t(19) = 1.72, p = .103. Finally, we used a paired-sample t-test in order 
to compare the BPs in the two sessions, and again found no significant difference, t(19) = 1.91, p = 
.072. Indeed, neither the BPs in the first (M = 1024) nor the second (M = 958) session differed from 
1000ms (both ts < 1.13, ps > .271), which represents the halfway point between the short and long 
standard stimulus durations. 
 
3.3. Meditation group 
 
Fig. 2 shows the mean proportion of “long” responses plotted against duration for participants 
in the meditation group. These proportions were entered into a four-way within-participant analysis 
of variance as above. As expected, there was a significant main effect of Duration, F(6, 114) = 
264.15, p < .0001, indicating that mean proportions varied across stimulus durations. There was 
																																								 																				
2 Although z-scores sometimes refer to standardized scores, signal detection theory defines z as the inverse function of 
the normal distribution curve (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991), which is how the term is used here. Also, in order for this 
transformation to be accomplished on proportions, values of 1 and 0 had to be replaced with a high and low decimal, 
respectively. We substituted .944 for 1, and .056 for 0 in line with previous research (e.g., Effron, Niedenthal, Gil, & 
Droit-Volet, 2006).	
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also a main effect of Session, F(1, 19) = 27.40, p < .0001, indicating that the proportion of “long” 
responses was greater in the second session (M = 0.564) compared with the first (M = 0.477). These 
results were qualified by a significant Session x Duration interaction, F(6, 114) = 6.19, p < .0001. 
Pairwise comparisons revealed that the proportion of “long” responses was significantly greater in 
the second session for all stimulus durations (600, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400ms) other than the two 
standards (400, 1600ms) (all ps < .021 after Bonferroni correction). Finally, the main effect of 
Shape was close to significant, F(1, 19) = 3.82, p = .065, although we have no sensible explanation 
for this and will not pursue it further here. No other main effects or interactions were significant (all 
Fs < 1.56, all ps > .105). 
To further examine whether stimulus durations differed in the two sessions, we used a one-
sample t-test to determine if the average d’	was significantly different from zero. As expected from 
the above results, there was a significant difference, M = 0.28; t(19) = 5.40, p < .0001. This 
reinforced the idea that participants overestimated the stimulus durations in the second session 
compared with the first. 
Finally, we used a paired-sample t-test in order to compare the BPs in the two sessions, and 
found a significant difference, t(19) = 5.05, p < .0001. The BPs in the first session (M = 998) did not 
differ from 1000ms, t(19) = 0.08, p = .936. In contrast, the BPs in the second session (M = 876) 
were significantly lower than 1000ms, t(19) = 4.13, p = .001. 
An overestimation of stimulus durations in the second session compared with the first, 
combined with a decrease in BPs, might be interpreted within an arousal framework. An increase in 
arousal is most often associated with an increase in pacemaker speed, and this, in turn, increases the 
number of pulses accumulated within a given time period and produces an overestimation. 
However, this increase in pacemaker speed would produce a multiplicative effect, i.e., an increase 
in the magnitude of the time distortion as the length of stimulus durations increased (Maricq et al., 
1981; Meck, 1983). In order to test this hypothesis, we compared the average d’	of the shortest 
comparison durations (400, 600, and 800ms) with the average d’	of the longest comparison 
durations (1200, 1400, and 1600ms), with an arousal account predicting an increase in d’ for longer 
durations (Gil, Niedenthal, & Droit-Volet, 2007). However, we found no significant difference, 
t(19) = 1.12, p = .275. As such, an account based upon increased pacemaker speed was not 
supported. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
The present experiment showed that listening to a mindfulness meditation exercise, which 
focussed one’s attention on the movement of the breath in the body, led participants to classify 
stimulus durations as “long” more often in comparison with prior to this exercise. In contrast, 
participants who listened to a neutral recording (an audiobook) showed no change in their responses 
in comparison with before the task. 
With regard to internal-clock models, an overestimation of duration is often explained through 
an increase in arousal (an increase in pacemaker speed increases the number of pulses 
accumulated), while an underestimation is usually associated with attentional mechanisms (the 
task’s attentional demands cause the switch to open and pulses are lost). Although meditation in this 
experiment produced an overestimation, we interpret the current results within an attentional 
framework for several reasons. First, we found no evidence of a multiplicative effect due to arousal, 
whereby increased pacemaker speed produces larger overestimates of duration as the length of the 
stimulus duration increases. Second, mindfulness meditation is widely accepted as producing a 
reduction in stress and arousal (e.g., Chang et al., 2004; Chu, 2010; Cincotta, Gehrman, 
Gooneratne, & Baime, 2011) rather than an increase. Third, previous research has already 
established a link between focussed attention during meditation and activation in multiple brain 
regions associated with attention/monitoring (e.g. Brefczynski-Lewis, Lutz, Schaefer, Levinson, & 
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Davidson, 2007; Dickenson, Berkman, Arch, & Lieberman, 2013). Therefore, participants’ 
overestimations are more likely the result of attentional changes, producing either improved 
attentional resources that allow increased attention to temporal processing, or a shift to internally 
oriented attention that may increase the size of the subjective time units (Glicksohn, 2001). Teasing 
these two accounts apart is beyond the scope of the current research but provides an interesting path 
for future studies. 
By asking participants to follow a 10min mindfulness meditation, our manipulation focussed 
on what is likely a temporary change in perception. While mindfulness practice (which can be 
considered a state; Davis & Hayes, 2011) aims to increase one’s ability to remain mindful during 
everyday life (trait mindfulness), the relationship between these two constructs is far from clear 
(Thompson & Waltz, 2007). Indeed, our results found no relationship between trait mindfulness and 
individual performance on the temporal bisection task, although a larger sample size may provide 
the statistical power needed to detect what are likely to be relatively small effects. Certainly, an 
interesting consideration for future research would be to investigate whether individuals who score 
higher on trait-based mindfulness measures show a difference in their perceptions of time (and 
hence their response bias) in comparison with low scorers. Related, we might also consider how 
long our demonstrated change in time perception lasts, and so begin to explore the development 
from state to trait mindfulness. 
In the present experiment, an unselected sample of undergraduate students demonstrated a 
significant meditation effect despite a lack of prior training. While typical participants usually 
receive professional training through the attendance of meditation classes or retreats (e.g., Mrazek 
et al., 2013), only a recorded exercise was provided here. As a result, our participants also received 
a comparatively short meditation experience (ten minutes, rather than many hours or days). Taken 
together, these aspects demonstrate that subjective time is very sensitive to even short meditative 
states and the changes these induce, even for those who are not meditation experts. This result has 
useful implications for future research and also treatment protocols. 
We predict that the type of mindfulness meditation used is an important factor in the resulting 
change to the internal clock. Here, we featured a breathing exercise that aimed to focus participants’ 
attention on the movement of the breath in the body. Such an internally oriented task, involving 
focussed attention, may produce different results compared with an open monitoring meditation, for 
example, where moment-to-moment attention is not focussed on any explicit object. Indeed, 
researchers showed that activation linked with compassion meditation (which encourages a state of 
loving kindness and compassion towards all beings) related to brain circuitry involved with 
emotion, empathy, and theory of mind (Lutz, Brefczynski-Lewis, Johnstone, & Davidson, 2008). 
As such, it may be that other types of meditation can lead to increased arousal or an increase in 
attention to external events. 
In conclusion, the present findings represent some of the first to demonstrate how mindfulness 
meditation can alter the perception of time, and the first regarding time estimation. We also show 
that the temporal bisection task is ideally suited to an in-depth investigation of the mechanisms 
underlying this effect. Given the increasing popularity of mindfulness both in everyday practice and 
as a recognised basis for clinical treatment, its relationship with time perception may provide an 
important step in our understanding of this pervasive, ancient practice in our modern world. 
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